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THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CAN THEY
CO-EXIST?
On October 28, 1998, President Clinton signed a piece of legislation into
law entitled the "Digital Millennium Copyright Act" ("DMCA" or "Act").'
The legislation was enacted, among other reasons, to address intellectual
property concerns in the digital age. The DMCA addresses the fear of
copyright holders that "their works, now available on the Internet in digital
form, will be misappropriated."2 The Act accomplishes this first by making
it illegal to "circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected"' under the Act. However, it does not stop there.
Not only is it illegal to actually "hack around" a protective security measure
for the purposes of copying protected works, but it is also illegal to
"manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof that...
is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to" a protected work.4
Think about that for a minute. It may sound reasonable at first blush,
but when one gets beyond all the technical language, the provision is
essentially preventing anyone from telling someone else how to make a copy
of a protected work. Essentially, it is illegal for me to tell you how to
deactivate a protective measure installed on a copyrighted work. Admit-
tedly, once the information has been passed along, you are armed with
knowledge of how to "circumvent" a "technological measure," but so what?
Where is the harm? Knowing how to copy and actually copying are two
entirely different things. More importantly, doesn't preventing us from
telling one another how to make copies present a problem in the face of the
First Amendment freedom of speech?
This Note will discuss some of the history and goals of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, as well as the policy in support of its broad
reach. It will then follow the application of the DMCA in the August 2000
' Carolyn Andrepont, Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Copyright Protectionfor the DigitalAge, 9
DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 397, 398 (1999).
'Id at 399.
3 Copyright Protection and Management Systems, 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
' 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2)-(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
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case Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.s First, in its discussion of
Reimerdes, this Note will recount the events giving rise to plaintiff's suit.
Then the Note will analyze the court's application of the DMCA to
plaintiff's claim. Following that, an effort will be made to determine the
constitutional validity of the provision prohibiting the dissemination of
information as to how to circumvent technological measures that prevent
protected works in light of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech.
It has been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
that essential economic incentives for creative processes are provided by
copyright protection.6 The Court has stated, "encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "' It would be
difficult for anyone to disagree with the overwhelming importance of
copyright protection in achieving an environment which fosters creativity
and thereby promotes social and technological advancement in pursuit of a
greater good. We are now in the twenty-first century, and the Internet and
other technological advances have created a global marketplace for the
exchange of ideas and creative works! These advances have created new
opportunities "for copyright owners to exploit and benefit from their
work."9 However, along with the benefits that these advancements have
bestowed upon copyright holders, there is a tremendous increase in the ease
with which protected works can be pirated." This by-product of the
Internet and the "information age" resulted in the need to revisit copyright
law and update it in an effort to combat these new problems."1 This update
came in the form of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which is
intended to extend copyright law to provide the necessary tools to protect
copyrighted materials in the technologically enhanced marketplace. 2 The
question is: has it been expanded too far?
' Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reirnerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
' Jo Dale Carothers, Note, Protection ofIntellectual Property on the World Wide Web: Is the Digital
Millennium Cop'yrigbtAct Sufficient?, 41 ARiz. L. REV. 937, 946 (1999).
Id at 947.
Andrepont, supra note 1, at 397.
Id at 398.
I d
Id
12 Id at 399.
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In the context of this paper, the question of expansion will be limited to
an examination of 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2), the provision which makes it
illegal to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part
thereof, that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circum-
venting a technological measure that effectively controls access to" a
protected work." The broad reach of this provision will become more clear
when we turn to its practical application in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes.
Before going directly to the case, the policy reasons asserted in support of
the broad reach of the Act within the context of the movie industry should
be briefly enumerated. Copyright industries are the United States' most
important generator of exports. 4 "The international sale and export of films
and videos, literature, music and software, exceeds the export of both
automobiles and agricultural products.""5 Unfortunately, these are the
industries most vulnerable to advancing technology. The movie industry is
undoubtedly one of the most affected industries. 6 According to the Vice-
President of Trade and Federal Affairs for the Motion Picture Association
of America (MPAA), the American film industry loses almost $2.5 billion a
year because of inadequate protection available to intellectual property in the
face of current technology." Obviously, the concern is that without
adequate protection from piracy, the movie industry will experience a severe
devaluation, and because the industry is so important to the national
economy, the effects would be far reaching. 8
For years now, the MPAA has made their films available for rental on
video cassette. As you are aware, when you make a trip to the movie rental
store, more and more films are available both in the old video format as well
as on what is called a digital versatile disc, or "DVD." DVDs were first
introduced in the United States in 1996, and currently more than 4,000 films
have been released in DVD format, and more are being issued at the rate of
13 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2)-(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
" Andrepont, supra note 1, at 405.
15 J
16 id.
17 Id
is Id at 407.
2001]
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over 40 new titles each month. 19 Movies in DVD format are of higher visual
and audio quality than videotapes due to their digital encoding.2"
Digital technology involves the use of computers to encode visual and
auditory information so it can be "stored, displayed, transmitted and
manipulated."21 In addition to providing a higher viewing quality, the digital
format allows works to be copied for distribution with greater ease and speed
than was possible with video technology. 2  The other key difference
between video tapes and DVDs is that the digital format ensures that the first
copy is of the exact same quality as the fiftieth copy.23 This is not the case
with video tapes. If you copy a video, the quality diminishes to a great
extent with each copy that is made. Since successive copies of DVDs do not
experience a reduction in quality, current "electronic information systems
make it possible for individuals to deliver perfect copies of digitized works
to an infinite number of recipients throughout the world."24 This is the crux
of the movie industry's worries.
To aid in the protection of their copyrighted works, motion picture
companies, like the plaintiffs in the Reimerdes case, "insisted upon the
development of an access control and copy prevention system to inhibit the
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of motion pictures" before they
would release films in the digital format.2' The "technological measure" that
was developed and put into place is called the Content Scramble System, or
CSS,2' which is "an encryption-based security... system that requires the
use of appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a
computer DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not copy,
motion pictures on DVDs."2 In other words, the makers of DVD players
buy a license to install a decryption program in the DVD player itself, and
that decryption program unscrambles the CSS encryption program so that
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing to the preliminary injunction, not the final adjudication on the merits found at
111 F. Supp. 294. Both the preliminary injunction and the final adjudication will be discussed later in the
Note).
20Id
21 Andrepont, supra note 1, at 400.
2lId
23 Id
24 Ild
' Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
"Id
old (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8:275
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only licensed machines can play back the movies published on DVD.
Additionally, the CSS program prohibits copying the material on the DVDs
without the aid of a decryption device. The creation of the encryption
system was successful in mitigating the movie industry's fears, as "CSS has
been licensed to hundreds of DVD player manufacturers and DVD content
distributors in the United States and around the world,"28 and, as mentioned
above, films are being marketed at a very fast rate in the digital format.29
Unfortunately for those relying on the protection of the Content
Scramble System, in late September of 1999, Jon Johansen, a Norwegian
teenager who was fifteen years old at the time, and two individuals with
whom he had made contact over the Internet, "reverse engineered a licensed
DVD player and discovered the CSS encryption algorithm... . 3 0 The three
then used this information to create what they cleverly called "DeCSS.""
DeCSS is a computer program "capable of decrypting or 'ripping' encrypted
DVDs, thereby allowing playback on non-compliant computers as well as
the copying of decrypted files to computer hard drives."" In other words,
they had hacked the CSS device. More specifically, to quote the statutory
language, they had "circumvent[ed] a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under" the DMCA.33
Unfortunately, the three young men didn't stop there. Jon Johansen
posted the code to DeCSS on his personal Internet web site and sent out a
message to members of an Internet mailing list, informing them that he had
done so.3" Since this initial spreading of the word, "DeCSS has become
widely available on the Internet."" s In fact, "hundreds of sites now purport
to offer the software for download."36 In addition, a few other programs
which promise to decrypt CSS-protected DVDs have also appeared on the
Internet.3" In January of 1999, Jon Johansen was prosecuted in Norway for
the development of DeCSS.38 At the time of this writing, the disposition of
Id
29Id
'o Reimerdes, I IIF. Supp. 2d at 311.
31 Id
32i
17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
"Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
35 Id
36 Id
37 Id
1 Id
2001]
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Johansen's case did not appear on record.39 It is at this point that we turn to
the substance of the Reimerdes case, which demonstrates the broad reach of
17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2).
Almost immediately following the development and distribution of
DeCSS, the Motion Picture Association of America acted under the DMCA
and "demand[ed] that Internet service providers remove DeCSS from their
servers and, where the identities of the individuals responsible were known,
that those individuals stop posting DeCSS." 4 While this action did succeed
in removing many of the known DeCSS postings, it did not stop everyone. 1
The original defendants in Reimerdes, Shawn Reimerdes, Roman Kazan,
and Eric Coley, a.k.a "Emmanuel Goldstein" (after the leader of the
underground in George Orwell's 19844), are each associated with web sites
that began distributing DeCSS, and each one was personally involved in that
distribution.43 Needless to say, Reimerdes, Kazan and Corley did not
respond to the Motion Picture Association's demand that they remove
DeCSS from their web sites, and the MPAA took legal action under the
DMCA alleging violation of the provision prohibiting trafficking in
technology which circumvents a technological measure that controls access
to copyrighted material, 17 U.S.C. S 120 1(a)(2)(A).' The Association moved
for a preliminary injunction which would stop further dissemination of
DeCSS pending resolution of the suit.4"
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
On February 2,2000, the memorandum opinion granting the preliminary
injunction was delivered by Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of
New York.' To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must
show "(a) irreparable harm, and (b) either (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them
fair grounds for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its
39 Id
' Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
42 Id at 308.
Q Id at 214-15.
I da1 at 215.
"Id at 211.
Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
[Vol. 8:275
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favor."47 The court, on examining the MPAA's motion, decided that they
met the requirement of irreparable injury. 8 In arriving at this conclusion,
the court determined that the fact that the plaintiffs did not allege that
defendants had infringed their copyrights, but instead alleged that defendants
had facilitated that infringement by offering technology that circumvents
plaintiffs' copyright protection system, was a "distinction without a
difference" with respect to the irreparable injury inquiry."9 The court based
this finding on the assertion that "[I]f plaintiffs are correct on the merits,
they face substantially the same immediate and irreparable injury from
defendants' posting of DeCSS as they would if defendants were infringing
directly."'
With respect to the likelihood of the movant's success on the merits, the
court's analysis was more detailed. Judge Kaplan found that the "plaintiffs
ha[d] an extremely high likelihood of prevailing on the merits"51 because it
is "clear that CSS is a technological measure that effectively controls access
to plaintiffs' copyrighted movies""2 and "there is no evidence of any
commercially significant purpose of DeCSS other than circumvention of
CSS . . . ."' Having made those findings, the court concluded that the
defendants had "likely" violated not only S 1201(a)(2)(A), which prohibits
any person from "manufactur[ing], import[ing], offerting] to the public,
provid[ing] or otherwise traffic[king] in any technology.., that is primarily
designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access"' to a protected work, but S
1201(a)(2)(B) as well. Section 1201(a)(2)(B) prohibits all of the above
mentioned activities if the technology "has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure"
that protects a copyrighted work."5
At that point, the defendants' only hope was to show that their activities
fell within one of the exceptions to the DMCA, to show that the DMCA
" Id. at 215.
49 Id
' Id It is necessary for the court to extinguish this distinction because they did not want to address
contributory infringement as Congress did not include contributory infringement in the Act.
slId at 217.
52 Reimerds, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
Id at 217.
17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
S 5 1201(a)(2)(B).
20011
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restricted "fair use" of the copyrighted material, or to show that there was
a constitutional impediment to the provisions that they had allegedly
violated. 6 The court found that upon this initial review, the defendants'
activities in no way fell within the DMCA exceptions." Additionally,
despite the court's earlier assertion that for the purposes of an immediate and
irreparable injury it was a "distinction without a difference"" that the
defendants were not themselves infringing on the copyright, the court
abandoned this reasoning with respect to the fair use argument. Instead, the
court stated that defendants were not entitled to a fair use defense as they
themselves were not actually infringing on the copyright, only assisting
infringement by posting the DeCSS code!9
The question of the constitutionality of the Act itself still remained. The
"[d]efendants contend[ed] that the DeCSS computer program is protected
speech and that the DMCA, at least insofar as it purports to prohibit the
dissemination of DeCSS to the public, violates the First Amendment."' As
this issue is the crux of this paper, at this time we will simply acknowledge
that the Southern District of New York determined for the purposes of the
preliminary injunction that it was unlikely that the DMCA was unconstitu-
tional since 1) the broad power given Congress by the Necessary and Proper
Clause could be seen to justify the DMCA as an instrument in carrying out
the objective of the Copyright Clause6 1 and 2) in applying a traditional
balancing test between the public interest in the restriction and the public
interest in the type of speech at issue, the restrictions provided by the
DMCA exist to " 'encourage individual effort by personal gain' and thereby
'advance public welfare' through the 'promot[ion of] the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,' "62 while the computer code of the type at issue "does little
to further traditional First Amendment interests."63 Hence, the preliminary
injunction was granted.
"Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
7 id at 217-19.
" Id at 215.
I' da at 219.
" Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
" Id at 221.
62 ld at 222 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)); U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, di. 8.
'3Reirnerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 222; Judge Kaplan also found that the defendants' other attacks on the
DMCA, "vagueness" and "overbreadth," and their attack on the injunction itself, prior restraint,' would
also fail, see id at 223-26.
[Vol. 8:275
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Following the grant of the preliminary injunction, both Shawn
Reimerdes and Roman Kazan settled with the motion picture association,
leaving only Eric Corley and his company, 2600 Enterprises, Inc., in the
suit.' At the conclusion of the preliminary injunction hearing, the plaintiffs
attempted to enjoin the defendants from "linking" to other sites that posted
DeCSS. 6s "Linking" refers to the ability to jump from one web page or web
site to another on the Internet by moving the cursor over the "link" text and
pressing the mouse button." It allows for very quick navigation from one
web page or site to another. In this case, the plaintiffs had been granted a
preliminary injunction which prohibited the defendants from posting the
code on their own web sites, but the plaintiffs neglected until the end of the
hearing to ask that the defendants be enjoined from providing these easy-
access links to other web sites where the code was still available.
Unfortunately for the MPAA, the court did not enjoin the defendants
from linking to sites still offering copies of the DeCSS code.67 Because of
this, in an act which Eric Corley termed one of "electronic civil disobedi-
ence," his web site continued to support links to web sites that still offered
DeCSS. 6' His web site proclaimed: " 'We have to face the possibility that
we could be forced into submission. For that reason it's especially important
that as many of you as possible, all throughout the world, take a stand and
mirror [copy] these files.' "69 Bad attitude? Probably. Within his rights? I
think so. At this point, we will turn to the main opinion in the case.
AUGUST 17,2000 DECISION OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YORK IN UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. V REIMERDES
Before moving to the arguments presented and the decisions made in the
case, it will be helpful and important for our understanding to review the
provisions of the DMCA which will be relevant to this discussion. As
mentioned above, the provision which this case centers upon is 17 U.S.C. S
1201(a)(2). For the purposes of this paper, the arguments and defenses
surrounding S 1201(a)(2)(A) will constitute the majority of the discussion,
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 312 n.91.
Id. at 312.
6 Id. at 324.
aId at 312.
68eid
68 Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 313.
2001]
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but it is helpful to be familiar with § 1201(a)(2)(B) and $ 1201(a)(2)(C) as well,
as there were arguments we will touch on briefly that were asserted based on
these provisions.
To review: Section 1201(a)(2) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
provides for the following:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public,
provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology... that-(A)
is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title; (B) has
only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title [17
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.]; or (C) is marketed by that person or
another acting in concert with that person with that
person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title.7'
The first obvious question is, does DeCSS qualify as "technology" which
"circumvent[s] a technological measure that effectively controls access"" to
a protected set? The court tells us that computer code is "unquestionably...
'technology' within the meaning of the statute."' Since the statutory
definition of "circumvent a technological measure" includes "descrambl[ing]
a scrambled work, [or]... decrypt[ing] an encrypted work," 73 it is clear that
DeCSS, which decrypts, or "rips" DVDs encrypted with the Content
Scramble System thereby allowing the DVDs to be copied,74 is exactly what
the statute is designed to prevent. Therefore, as long as the Content
Scramble System (CSS) itself is a "technological measure [designed to]
'effectively control access to a [protected] work,' " the defendants will have
violated the DMCA. 75 To answer this question, the court looks not only to
- 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
71 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
72 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
71 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
' Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
7' AL
[Vol. 8:275
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the statutory language defining "effectively controls access to a work," but
also to the legislative history of the DMCA.'6
The statute itself tells us that "a technological measure 'effectively
controls access to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its
operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the
work.""7 The court goes through the technical application of CSS and
determines that since one cannot gain access to a CSS-protected work
without three keys that are required by the software, and those keys can
only be lawfully acquired by entering into a license agreement under
authority of the copyright holder or by purchasing a licensed DVD player,
"under the express terms of the statute, CSS 'effectively controls access' to
copyrighted DVD movies."78
In response to the defendants' argument that CSS obviously did not
"effectively" control access to copyrighted works since a method to
circumvent it had been created, the court pointed to the legislative history
of the statute where the House Commerce Committee made it clear that
"measures based on encryption or scrambling 'effectively control' access to
copyrighted works, although it is well known that what may be encrypted
or scrambled often may be decrypted or unscrambled." 9 Additionally, the
defendants' interpretation of the statute would inexplicably limit the statute's
protection to those works which were completely protected and give no
protection to those measures which were vulnerable to being circumvented."
Clearly, this is nonsensical. It is pretty clear at this point that, as written, the
DMCA without question renders the defendants' conduct unlawful. There
can be no doubt that the posting of the DeCSS code on Eric Corley's website
is "offer[ing] to the public, provid[ing], or otherwise traffic[king] in . ..
technology. .. that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of circumventing a technological measure [CSS] that effectively controls
access to" a protected work.8 So, since the court seems to have this correct,
unless the defendants can convince the court that their actions fall within the
statute's stated and implied exceptions or a traditional fair use exception, or
6 d. at 318.
17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
7S Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317-18.
Id. at 318.
'17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
2001]
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unless they can show that the statute itself is constitutionally unsound, they
will be, and should be under this law as written, enjoined. First, we will
examine the defendants' attempts to squeeze themselves into available
exceptions, and then we will turn to the constitutional defenses and issues
presented by this case.
First, the defendants insisted that DeCSS was not created for the purpose
of pirating copyrighted motion pictures from DVDs. 2 In other words, it is
not technology "primarily designed or produced for the purpose" of
circumventing a copyright protection measure. They support this argument
with the testimony of the developer, Jon Johansen, who testified that he
created DeCSS in order to make a DVD player that would operate on a
computer running an operating system called "Linux." 3 An "operating
system is a software program that .. .supports the functions of software
programs called 'applications' that perform specific user-oriented tasks." 4
CSS, among other things, prohibits CSS-encrypted DVDs from being played
back on non-compliant computers, computers that do not have a certain
operating system." Windows, by Microsoft, is the most commonly used
operating system in the United States86 and is a compliant operating system,
while Linux, at the time DeCSS was created, was not. 7 So, Johansen insisted
that he was just trying to develop a way to play DVDs on a different
operating system.
First of all, the court did not credit Johansen's testimony,8 and second,
it defeated the argument by pointing out that the reason why DeCSS was
developed is unrelated and immaterial to whether or not the defendants
before this court violated the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA 9
Since Jon Johansen was not a defendant in this case, his motivations for
developing DeCSS were irrelevant.
The defendants then tried to fit themselves inside the explicit statutory
exceptions for "reverse engineering,"' "encryption research,"91 and "security
82 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
" d at 305.
4 Id.
5 Id at 303.
Id at 305.
87 Id
" Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
Id at 338.
'o 17 U.S.C. S 1201(0 (Supp. V 1999).
9 17 U.S.C. S 1201(g) (Supp. V 1999).
[Vol. 8:275
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testing."92 With respect to the reverse engineering exception, the statute
provides that a person who has
lawfully obtained the right to use a copy.of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a particular portion of that
program for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing
those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve
interoperability" of an independently created computer
program with other programs.., to the extent any such acts
of identification and analysis do not constitute infringement
under this title. 4
Additionally, the dissemination of the technology used to circumvent a
measure such as CSS would be permitted if it was "solely for the purpose"
of achieving interoperability with an independently created computer
program."' In this case, the defendants argued that they were just disseminat-
ing the DeCSS information so that DVDs could be interoperable with Linux
systems.
The court first points out that the defendants were not the authors of
DeCSS; they had not done any reverse engineering.' Instead, they simply
copied the DeCSS code and posted it on their website for public access."
Additionally, as mentioned above, the court did not believe the author
Johansen's testimony that he had created the program for the "sole purpose"
of creating a Linux DVD player. 8 (This would be an example of
interoperability). Instead, the court found that both the defendants and the
developer knew that the DeCSS program was developed on and runs on a
Windows operating system, and therefore could be used to decrypt and copy
CSS-protected DVDs on both Windows and Linux machines. It seems that
92 17 U.S.C. S 12010) (Supp. V 1999).
'4 "[Tihe term 'interoperability' means the ability of computer programs to exchange information,
and... mutually ... use the information which has been exchanged." 17 U.S.C. S 1201(f)(4) (Supp. V
1999).
17 U.S.C. S 1201(0 (1) (Supp. V 1999).
17 U.S.C. S 1201(0(3) (Supp. V 1999).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
'7id
" Id at 311.
2001)
13
Shockley: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the First Amendment: Can
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2001
. 1NTELL. PROP. L.
the court is correct in dismissing this defense as well, especially when we
remember the proclamation made by the defendants on their website with
regard to copying DeCSS: "[It is] especially important that as many of you
as possible, all throughout the world, take a stand and mirror [copy] these
files."99 This statement hardly seems the statement of someone who just
wants to let those few individuals who happen to have Linux operating
systems to be able to playback rented DVDs!
With respect to the "encryption research" exception, it is not a violation
of the DMCA for an individual who is involved in "good faith encryption
research" to develop means to circumvent protective technology, if 1) the
person has lawfully obtained the encrypted copy of the work, 2) the act is
necessary to conduct the encryption research, and 3) a good faith effort has
been made to obtain authorization from the copyright owner before
developing and executing the circumvention."° To determine if an
individual is engaged in good faith encryption research,
the Court is instructed to consider factors including whether
the results of the putative encryption research are dissemi-
nated in a manner designed to advance the state of knowl-
edge of encryption technology versus facilitation of copy-
right infringement, whether the person in question is
engaged in legitimate study of or work in encryption, and
whether the results of the research are communicated in a
timely fashion to the copyright owner."'
It would be difficult to disagree with the court's finding that the defendants
were not in any way involved in "good faith" encryption research as defined
by the statute. They posted the DeCSS code for all the world to use; they
did not make any effort to inform the copyright owners of the results of
DeCSS development, and they made no effort to gain authorization from the
copyright owners to do the research in the first place. 2 Additionally,
though not specifically mentioned by the court in this instance, the
U k at 313.
17 U.S.C. S 1201(g) (Supp. V 1999).
Iol Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
102 Id.
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defendants were not involved in encryption research at all, good faith or
otherwise; they simply disseminated the information.
The third explicit exception the defendants attempted to fall within was
that of "security testing," which allows an individual to assess a computer,
computer system, or computer network, solely for the purpose of a good
faith investigation or to correct a security flaw or vulnerability, all done with
the authorization of the owner of the computer system or network.0 3 The
court in this instance also arrives at the only possible correct conclusion.
There is no evidence whatsoever that DeCSS has anything to do with testing
computers, computer systems, or networks, let alone the absence of any sort
of authorization for such testing."°
Finally, the court addresses the defendants' argument that their activities
were permitted under the fair use doctrine. This doctrine, "limits the
exclusive rights of a copyright holder by permitting others to make limited
use of portions of the copyrighted work, for appropriate purposes, free of
liability for copyright infringement."05 The traditional value of the doctrine
has been that it facilitates literary and artistic criticism, teaching and
scholarship, or other socially useful forms of expression, by allowing one
other than the person who holds the copyright to reprint or quote the
copyrighted work in certain circumstances.") It has been viewed as the
"safety valve that accommodates the exclusive rights conferred by copyright
with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.""07 The
defendants argue that "the DMCA cannot properly be construed to make it
difficult or impossible to make any fair use of plaintiffs' copyrighted works
and that the statute therefore does not reach their activities, which are simply
a means to enable users of DeCSS to make such fair uses. " "'
Once again, as in the preliminary injunction, the court makes the
distinction that the defendants here are not accused of infringement; they are
accused of trafficking in the technology that allows circumvention of
copyright protection measures."' Additionally, the court points to
legislative history, which demonstrates that the decision not to have fair use
17 U.S.C. S 12016) (Supp. V 1999).
104 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
M" AL
106 J
107 Id at 322.
lat 322.
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as a defense to a claim under § 120 1(a) was intentional."' Those two findings
legitimize the court's conclusion to disregard the fair use defense. Addition-
ally, the court later points out the fact that not being able to copy a DVD
does not put a very meaningful restriction on fair use of the copyrighted
material."' All types of fair use would necessarily involve one or more of
the following: "1) quotation of the words of the script, 2) listening to the
recorded sound track, including both verbal and non-verbal elements, and 3)
viewing of the graphic images." 112 All of these types of use can be accom-
plished without copying a DVD. For example, most movies available on
DVD are also available on videocassette, which can be rented and, with
permission, can be easily copied if copying from a DVD is impossible
without a decryption code.' Additionally, anyone needing to quote
language from a DVD could simply rent or purchase the DVD and write the
language down, giving credit to the authors."4 Accordingly, up to this point,
it does not seem that an error was made by the Southern District of New
York in its interpretation of the DMCA and its application to this case. As
the DMCA is written, it seems very clear that the defendants are in violation
of the Act. But is the Act written correctly? Is it constitutional? As we turn
to the constitutional defense presented by the defendants, it is less certain
that the court has reached the correct conclusion.
In what appears to be their most viable defense, the defendants assert that
the DMCA, at least as it applies to the public dissemination of the DeCSS
computer code, violates the First Amendment to the Constitution."' They
claim that the violation occurs in two ways. First, defendants argue that
computer code is protected speech. Therefore, the DMCA's prohibition of
dissemination of the DeCSS computer code violates their First Amendment
rights." 6 Secondly, they argue that the DMCA is unconstitutionally
overbroad because of the prevention of fair use of the encrypted works, and
because it is vague." 7 This Note will focus on the defendants' contentions
regarding the First Amendment, and will touch on the fair use issue.
11 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
i ld. at 337-38.
. Id at 337.
I1 Id
n Id at 338.
11 Id. at 325.
16 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
u Id. at 325-26.
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The court begins its analysis by examining the defendants' claim that
computer code is speech and therefore protected by the First Amendment.
The court is willing to accept that computer code is speech in the sense that
it is "expressive," stating, "All modes by which ideas may be expressed or,
perhaps, emotions evoked-including speech, books, movies, art, and
music-are within the area of First Amendment concern. As computer
code . . . is a means of expressing ideas, the First Amendment must be
considered before its dissemination may be prohibited or regulated."
1
'
However, the court goes on to point out that the "long history of First
Amendment jurisprudence makes equally clear that the fact that words,
symbols and even actions convey ideas and evoke emotions does not
inevitably place them beyond the power of government."" 9 Then the court
states that the regulation of different types or categories of expression is
subject to varying levels of judicial scrutiny. 12 0
In broad terms, the restrictions on expression fall into two main
categories: content-based restrictions and content-neutral restrictions.'
Content-based restrictions are "restrictions on the voicing of particular
ideas," while content-neutral restrictions have "nothing to do with the
content of the expression," but instead have an "incidental effect of limiting
expression."" Generally, the " 'government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.' "'" Consequently, content-based restrictions are subject to strict
scrutiny and "permissible only if they serve compelling state interests by the
least restrictive means available."124 The court then suggests that content-
neutral restrictions are examined with a less exacting standard.' This is the
rule according to case law cited by the court because "restrictions of this type
are not motivated by a desire to limit the message, [and therefore] they will
be upheld if they serve a substantial governmental interest and restrict First
Amendment freedoms no more than necessary. " 126
n Id. at 327.
119 i
u' Id
u l at 327.
m Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
m Id at 327 (quoting Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
U4 Id
126 Id at 327-28 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) and United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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Clearly, to make its job easier, the court wishes to find that the DMCA,
as it restricts the dissemination of the computer code DeCSS, is a content-
neutral restriction and therefore subject to a less strict standard of scrutiny
with respect to the First Amendment. To have the DMCA labeled"content-
neutral," the court must show, according to its own definition, that the
restriction has "nothing to do with the content of the expression" and that
any limitation on expression is incidental."' If the court decides that the
restriction is content-neutral, the standard to be applied with respect to the
First Amendment, as reiterated above, is that a substantial governmental
interest is served by the restriction and it "restrict[s] First Amendment
freedoms no more than necessary.""8
Obviously, the court determines that the DMCA is a content-neutral
restriction. It does so by quoting Wardv. Rock Against Racism, stating, "the
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or]
disagreement with the message it conveys,"129 and then concluding that it is
not the "message" that is harmful here, but the "distinctly functional" aspect
of the code, which as a "series of instructions," causes the computer to
perform a particular task.13 The court continues to attempt to separate out
expression and functionality, stating, "[t]he reason that Congress enacted the
anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA had nothing to do with suppressing
particular ideas of computer programmers and everything to do with
functionality.""' With this language ("nothing to do with suppressing...
ideas"), the court attempts to trick us into thinking they have met the
definition of content neutral, but the argument is empty, and it fails.
Why does the court's argument fail? The court accepts that computer
code is speech."' How can expression and functionality be separated?
Speech is expressive and functional all at once. Why would anyone speak if
not to achieve some function? The function of fictional literature is to
explore human crisis and make the reader feel things and understand things
that may not be readily available to her in her small part of the world. The
function of non-fiction is to teach, to explain our origins, to understand our
12 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
12 Id at 328 (emphasis added).
Id (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
10 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 328-29.
131 Id at 329 (emphasis added).
132 Id at 326.
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biology, to relive our history, to figure out what motivates us. The function
of persuasive speech is to persuade, whether it be who to vote for, what
product to buy, or what god in which to believe. If we accept that computer
code is speech, it is both expressive and functional. It expresses instructions
to a computer. Function cannot be separated from expression.
It is easy to see the absurdity of the court's suggestion that some speech
is "functional" while other speech is "expressive" when we ask ourselves why
anyone would ever write a book, give a speech, or even talk to their
neighbor if there was no purpose, or function? Even mindless banter with
an acquaintance over lunch serves the function of building community and
friendship. Functionality is inherent in any expression; it simply cannot be
separated out. If you remove function, you have evaporated expression. We
can't buy the court's empty language here. It doesn't give us any reason to
understand function as separable from expression other than just telling us
that is the case. What does the court think it is disagreeing with if not the
ideas and expressions of the programmers? It disagrees with the message
conveyed. It disagrees with thefunction of the message conveyed. The two
are one and the same.
The court acknowledges the argument of Lee Tien, a commentator who
suggests that "functionality" is a "proxy for effects or harm.""' The court
agrees that this may be true, but states that it is incorrect to assume that "the
chain of causation is too attenuated to justify the use of functionality to
determine the level of scrutiny."" Both assumptions are wrong as they are
based upon the faulty premise that functionality can be separated from
speech and expression. Because the two are inseparable, it is clear that this
is a content-based restriction, and therefore should be subject to strict
scrutiny under First Amendment doctrine, rendering the restriction
permissible by the court's own terms only if compelling state interests are
being served by the least restrictive means available."'
It is clear that the anti-trafficking provision of the Act infringes on the
First Amendment rights of the defendants by prohibiting them from posting
the DeCSS computer code on their Web sites. Clearly, the Act is prohibiting
the defendants from sharing the ideas and expressions of the computer
"id at 331 (quoting Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 695
(2000)).
14 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
". Id at 327.
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programmers, i.e. the DeCSS code. The Act is restricting their freedom of
speech. The court, having determined that the provision is "content neutral"
rather than "content based," now launches into an extended discussion of the
harmful "function" of the code, assuming incorrectly that it is capable of
limiting its attack to "function" at the exclusion of "expression."136 As it has
been shown that this is not a viable argument, we will set that aspect of the
court's discussion aside and focus on the court's attempt to establish a state
interest in retaining the protection provided by the anti-trafficking provision.
The discussion begins with the court suggesting that while there was a
time when copyright infringement could be adequately dealt with by
locating and prosecuting the infringer himself or herself, that is no longer the
case."" The example is given of making and selling unauthorized copies of
a copyrighted book. The copyright holder, once made aware of the
unauthorized copies, could trace the copies to the owner of the printing press
responsible and cut off the infringement at the source. 3 The court then
asserts, and no doubt correctly so, that the digital world presents some
different problems for the copyright holders of digitized works since the
copies made of the works can be sent almost instantly all over the world, and
each recipient can then send the works out again, resulting in an exponential
rather than linear explosion of the unauthorized copies of the works."'
Because of this phenomenon, the old solution of locating the original source
of the infringement and cutting it off is no longer an effective remedy to the
situation, according to the court. 4 '
To help explain this situation, the court uses an elaborate metaphor
likening the infringement of copyright to a disease. In a common-source
epidemic, where members of the population contract a non-contagious
disease from a source such as a contaminated well, the disease stops spreading
once the well is closed off. 4 This is, of course, the printing press example
of yesteryear; once we stop the printing press owner from copying the
books, we have eliminated the source of the disease.'42 On the other hand,
if there is a contagious disease, the disease will spread from person to person,
' Id at 330.
" Id at 331.
138 Id
13 Id at 331.
,40 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 331-32.
"I Id. at 332.
142 Ird
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and eliminating the initial source of the infection does not end the spreading
of the disease, or in our case, the infringement of the copyright.14
The court suggests that the metaphor breaks down principally at what it
refers to as the "final point."'" This "break down" refers to the fact that
"[i]ndividuals infected with a real disease become sick,
usually are driven by obvious self-interest to seek medical
attention, and are cured of the disease if medical science is
capable of doing so."14 The difference with this situation,
according to the court, is that [i]ndividuals infected with the
'disease' of capability of circumventing measures controlling
access to copyrighted works in digital form, however, do not
suffer from having that ability. They cannot be relied upon
to identify themselves to those seeking to control the
"disease." And their self-interest will motivate some to
misuse the capability, a misuse that; [sic] in practical terms,
often will be untraceable. 46
While this metaphor and its "break down" may appear accurate at first
blush, when examined closely, there are several problems with the court's
analysis. First, the court begins by equating the actual infringement of a
copyright with the contagious disease, then quickly changes to speaking of
the "capability of circumventing measures controlling access to copyrighted
works in digital form" as the "disease."147 This is obviously a problem when
we remember that while it is wrong to actually infringe on a copyright, there
is absolutely nothing wrong with knowing how to infringe on a copyright.
I know how to buy a copy machine and some paper and copy John
Grisham's latest novel a thousand times and turn around and sell it at half of
what the bookstores are offering. I know how to take the copyrighted
pictures that the professional photographer took at my wedding and copy
them all day long on a Kodak laser printer for much cheaper than it would
be to order them all from him. Indeed, after writing this Note, I know how
143 ,144 It/
s Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. at 332.
146 Id
147 Id
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to download DeCSS and copy DVDs to my heart's content. The point is,
I don't do any of these things, and the fact that I know how to do them is
irrelevant to any discussion of actual infringement; it is not a harm to the
holder of a copyright or a wrong with respect to copyright law to carry
around that knowledge. We cannot punish people for knowing how to
infringe on a copyright, and we should not be able to punish people for
telling others how to infringe on a copyright; no wrong has been committed
at that point. We need to focus on the infringers themselves. The individu-
als who have actually used the knowledge of how to infringe on copyrighted
material should be punished.
The court would no doubt respond to that argument by suggesting that,
with the book copying or laser copying of the photographs, it would be easy
to locate who was actually doing the infringing, and once the original
infringer was located and stopped, the infringement would end.14 I do not
know if that is actually true, considering that, as soon as one person bought
a Xeroxed copy of the John Grisham novel, they could themselves copy it
a thousand times, as could any of the other purchasers. Xerox machines are
just not that hard to come by. I will admit that it would be more difficult
for the infringers themselves, as it is a more cumbersome undertaking to
make Xerox copies than copies of a digital file.
So, for the sake of the discussion, we will examine the court's argument
that it would be easy to stop these other types of infringement and impossi-
ble to stop the copying of digital copyrighted works. As we mentioned
above, the court believes that those individuals who have the ability to
circumvent technological copyright protection measures are not going to
identify themselves because it is not in their self-interest to do so.'49 My
response is, why should they reveal themselves? Have my confessions above
that I know how to infringe on various copyrights done anyone any good in
the quest to stop copyright infringement? For argument's sake, let's assume
that not everyone who has the knowledge of how to copy DVDs is as honest
as I am; is that enough for us to throw the First Amendment out the
window? I do not think so. The anti-trafficking provision simply does not
meet the strict requirement of being the least restrictive means available"s to
serve the state interest in copyright protections. The court seems to just
' Id at 332.
I' dt!
ISO Id. at 327.
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throw up its hands and toss out the First Amendment in the face of the
"untraceable" nature of digital copyright infringement. I think they were a
little too hasty. It seems that there are other options which would not
infringe so greatly on First Amendment freedoms and yet still further and
protect state interests.
One of the court's main concerns is that there is no way to stop the
infringement at the source, so their answer is to suppress the communication
of the method of infringement. My suggestion to answer that concern is to
at least explore the option of stopping it at its source.
I am not a computer programmer. The extent of my knowledge with
respect to DVDs and DeCSS has been revealed in this Note. However, there
are plenty of people, as is evidenced by the terror the court feels at the
prospect of allowing communication between them, who are very well-
versed in all the ins and outs of computer programming and digital code.
These are the same people that came to the aid of the movie industry in the
early 1990s when the movie companies feared placing DVDs on the market
for home viewing because of the potential for copying them."5' In the early
1990s, these computer programmers came up with the Content Scramble
System to help allay the movie industry's fears."5 2 As I said, I am not a
computer programmer, but just off the top of my head I can think of several
things the movie industry could try before we disregard the First Amend-
ment.
First, why not install something on DVDs that destroys the original
when anyone attempts to copy it? That way, if I rent a DVD from the
movie store and attempt to copy it, as soon as I begin the process, the
original DVD is wiped out. Then when I get back to the store and attempt
to turn the DVD in, store personnel could check the DVD for damage. If
the DVD is destroyed, you just located the elusive "original source," and
action can be taken against a person who actually attempted to infringe on
a copyright, not just someone who possessed the knowledge of how to
infringe on a copyright and shared that information with someone else.
Additionally, any "exponential" increase in the spreading of the ability to
copy the movie would be eliminated as the movie would have been
destroyed and unavailable for copying and/or posting on the Internet.
"' Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
152 Id
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Another suggestion would be to make it more difficult for infringers by
creating several different content scrambler systems that could be installed
at random on DVDs so that the individual attempting to copy the digital file
would have to search for and try many different decryption devices in an
effort to copy any protected material. With this suggestion, the copying
could still be accomplished, but the court emphasizes the ease and quickness
with which DVDs can be copied in comparison to books (this is debatable
with respect to the time factor, as a courtroom demonstration indicated that
it would take approximately six hours to exchange decrypted movies with
another individual over the Internet..). Perhaps if it were more of an ordeal,
if it took more time and effort to copy the works, we could eliminate much
of the infringement.
The court does acknowledge the possibility of developing new technol-
ogy to protect against piracy, but dismisses it saying, "development and
implementation of a new DVD copy protection system is ... difficult and
costly ... and may carry with it the added problem of rendering the existing
installed base of compliant DVD players obsolete. " "s It is clear that cost
would be involved in any attempt to avoid DVD piracy; research and
implementation of new protective methods will be expensive, but if they are
effective, we will save the outrageous Cost inherent in an unnecessary
restriction of freedom of speech and expression. Additionally, the court does
not offer any evidence that the monetary cost involved in developing new
protection technology would be debilitating to the motion picture industry.
It seems that, at the very least, we should not abandon First Amendment
freedoms before even exploring the costs of alternative solutions.
Another very viable and much less restrictive means to protecting the
state's interest is the doctrine of contributory infringement. Contributory
infringement is a concept which derives its origins from tort law.' It stems
from the idea that "one who directly contributes to another's infringement
should be held accountable." 1 6 The often-cited statement of the doctrine is
in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.: "One
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
"' Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
13 Id. at 315.
LCRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 781 (5th ed. 2000).
's' Id. at 781-82.
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'contributory' infringer."" 7 In an amicus brief to the court, Associate
Professor of Law, Julie E. Cohen of Georgetown University Law Center,
asserts that the doctrine of contributory infringement may well be exactly
what the DMCA should have included rather than the overly restrictive anti-
trafficking provision.' Cohen points out that the doctrine affords strong
protection for copyright owners despite the holding in Sony Corp. ofAmerica
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in which the Supreme Court ruled that
contributory infringement liability would not rest with the VCR manufac-
turer, despite the fact that the VCR enabled ("contributed to") copying of
copyrighted works.5 9 Despite that particular holding, as Cohen points out,
"[c]ourts have uniformly extended contributory infringement liability to
those who use dual-purpose devices actively to participate in acts. of
infringement, as well as to those who knowingly provide facilities to
infringers."" Indeed, contributory infringement, in addition to being a
much less restrictive alternative with respect to infringing on First Amend-
ment freedoms, also promotes the government's interest in promoting
progress through copyright law. 6' This doctrine would accomplish what
was suggested above-punishing those who actually intend to do harm by
helping or encouraging others to infringe on copyrights. At the same time
however, it would not make it illegal to disseminate information regarding
the means to access copyrighted material for fair use purposes. In other
words, the freedom to share information would not be so violently restricted
as it is currently under the DMCA, but copyright owners would still have
a remedy against those individuals who were infringing or assisting in
infringement.
When we realize the less restrictive alternatives which are available to us,
it seems that the court has executed a knee-jerk reaction to what is, without
argument, a potentially dangerous situation. Unfortunately, it is not always
," Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,1162,170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
182, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1971).
a"l Brief of Amici Curiae Julie E. Cohen at 20, Reimerdes (No. 00 Civ. 0277 (LAK)).
159 IdM (discussing Sony Corp. of America v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440-42, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 699 (1984)) (where the court decided that the VCR had too many substantial non-
infringing uses to be subjected to contributory liability).
1" Brief of Amici Curiae Julie E. Cohen at 21; see, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590 (9th Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (N.D. Cal. 1996); A&M Records, Inc. v. Gen. Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948
F. Supp. 1449, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1818 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
1' Brief of Amici Curiae Julie E. Cohen at 21.
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the knee-jerk reaction that is the best. This decision has been made too
abruptly and without exploration into alternative solutions.
CONCLUSION
No one is denying that the digital age is presenting, and will continue to
present, new and numerous challenges for copyright law, but we cannot let
fear rule the day. The ultimate problem with this case is that the anti-
trafficking provision is unconstitutional in the face of the First Amendment.
The court acknowledges computer code as speech and that computer code
is expressive. The court then tells us that the restriction on this expressive
speech provided by the DMCA is not out of line with the First Amendment
because the problem with the code is its function, not its message.162 As
discovered above, the two concepts, function and message, are inextricably
bound to one another. If speech had no function, it would have no message,
and it would cease to be speech. The court fails from the beginning to
understand what the implications of this restriction really are.
The court then likens the ability to circumvent a technological measure
which protects a copyrighted work to having a disease which one does not
wish to cure in himself because he is not harmed by it. Therefore, there is
no method to stop the spread of the disease in this case, and people all over
the world may become infected with the knowledge of how to copy movies
from DVDs. Throughout the entire disease metaphor, the court has
forgotten one important fact-there is no harm in knowing how to copy a
DVD, or any other type of copyrighted material. There is only a problem
if one utilizes that knowledge to actually infringe on the intellectual property
rights of another or encourages others to infringe copyrighted works.
Of course the court believes, and no doubt rightfully so, that there are
people who will, once they have this knowledge, use it to pirate copies of
movies. Unfortunately, based on that fear alone, the court jumps to the
conclusion that this possibility is so horrific that it warrants throwing out
First Amendment freedoms to avoid it. Meanwhile, no other alternatives are
explored. In fact, we do not even really know what the degree of injury to
the movie industry would be in this case. No projections are made in that
regard; it is seemingly just assumed that the injury would be catastrophic.
" Reimerdes, III F. Supp. 2d at 329.
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It hardly seems just to abandon an elemental freedom without more of an
indication as to what the result of the exercise of that freedom would be.
Additionally, it seems extremely unreasonable when there are several
alternatives which would be enormously less restrictive and still further the
objectives of copyright law, which are progress and protection.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is the product of a new age. It is
the product of a time when the owners of copyrighted works can benefit
from the new venues for their work, but also a time when they must be
careful of new dangers presented by these venues. There is no question that
as the Act is currently written, the defendants in this case violated the law.
But is the law written correctly? This author does not believe that it is.
The defendants in this case told others how to decrypt a computer code
which protects copyrighted material. Was there any copyright infringement
by these defendants? No. Was there the possibility that someone they told
would infringe on a copyright? Yes, there is that possibility. Should not our
goal be to write our laws to punish or restrict people who do harm to others
or who intend to aid other individuals in causing harm? The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act as it is written today goes beyond that goal; it
restricts people who are not committing any harm at the expense of an
elemental freedom.
RACHEL SIMPSON SHOCKLEY
20011
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